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Abstract. Most of the theories of location on the market appear to be ideologically parsimonious at 
least in the sense that they take as primitive just one locative notion and define all the other locative 
notions in terms of it. Recently, however, the possibility of some exotic metaphysical scenarios 
involving gunky mixtures and extended simple regions of space has been argued to pose a significant 
threat to parsimonious theories of locations. The aim of this paper is to show that a theory taking as 
primitive a notion of plural pervasive location and allowing for irreducibly plural locative facts can 
account for all the putatively problematic scenarios for parsimonious theories of location. 
Furthermore, I will also argue that the notion of plural pervasive location is compatible with the 
possibility of multilocation.  
1. Introduction 
Almost all the theories of location that have been proposed in the literature so far appear to 
be theoretically parsimonious, at least in the sense that they take just one locative notion 
to be primitive and indefinable.1 Consider, as a way of example, the two theories that 
Parsons (2007) labels ‘S@’ and ‘S@O’. The first takes as primitive the notion of exact 
location  (the ‘shadow’ of an object in substantival space; see Parsons 2007: 203) and 
defines the notions of weak and pervasive location as follows (‘𝑥 ≤ 𝑦’ stands for ‘x is part 
of y’ and ‘𝑥 ∘ 𝑦’ for ‘x overlaps with y’): 
 
(1) x is weakly located at r =df x is exactly located at a region overlapping r 
 𝑥@𝑜𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ∃𝑠(𝑥@𝑠 ∧ 𝑠 ∘ 𝑟) 
 
 
(2) x is pervasively located at r =df x is exactly located at a superregion of r 
 𝑥@>𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ∃𝑠(𝑥@𝑠 ∧ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑠) 
 
The second takes as primitive the notion of weak location (a region that is not ‘completely 
free’ of the relevant object; see Parsons 2007: 203) and defines the notions of pervasive 
and exact location as follows: 
 
(3) x is pervasively located at r =df x is weakly located at every region overlapping 
r  
 𝑥@>𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ∀𝑠(𝑟 ∘ 𝑠 → 𝑥@𝑜𝑠) 
                                                     
1 See, among others, Casati and Varzi (1999), Parsons (2007), Gilmore (2018) and Kleinschmidt (2014). As 
Kleinschmidt (2016: 188, fn 5) notices, possible exceptions to this claim are represented by the theories 
defended by Fine (2006) and Simons (2014), who posit different relations for objects located in space and those 






(4) x is exactly located at r =df for every region s, s overlaps r if and only if x is 
weakly located at s2 
 𝑥@𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ∀𝑠(𝑟 ∘ 𝑠 ↔ 𝑥@𝑜𝑠)3 
 
Recently, however, some authors have argued that certain seemingly conceivable 
metaphysical scenarios appear to be intractable by parsimonious theories of location. 
Consider, for instance, the case of Nolan’s (2006) ‘Stoic gunk’. Imagine pouring equal 
parts of some gunky water and gunky wine in a glass enclosing a gunky region of space 
and have the water and the wine mix through and through. After the blending, every region 
inside the glass contains both water and wine, and yet there is no region inside the glass 
containing only water or only wine. As Leonard (2014) has shown, neither 𝑆@ and 𝑆@𝑜 
appear to be capable of accounting for this scenario. In this case, in fact, the following three 
claims seem to be all true: 
 
(5) Neither the water nor the wine have an exact location 
 ~∃𝑠(𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟@𝑠) ∧ ~∃𝑠(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒@𝑠) 
 
(6) Neither the water nor the wine pervade any region of space 
 ~∃𝑠(𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟@>𝑠) ∧ ~∃𝑠(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒@>𝑠) 
 
(7) Both the water and the wine are weakly located at every subregion of the 
region r at which their blend is exactly located4  
 ∀𝑠(𝑠 ≤ 𝑟 → 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟@𝑜𝑠 ∧ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒@𝑜𝑠) 
 
However, (5)-(7) are jointly inconsistent under the assumption of either 𝑆@ or 𝑆@𝑜, thus 
seemingly forcing friends of Stoic Gunk to take both the notions of weak and exact location 
to be primitive (Leonard 2014: 312-3). Similarly, Kleinschmidt (2016) has argued that, 
under the assumption of some seemingly plausible recombination principle, the possibility 
of extended simple regions of space is incompatible with parsimonious theories of location. 
Suppose, for instance, that there is an extended simple region of space having the size and 
shape of the Statue of Liberty. Imagine, furthermore, someone ‘dropping’ an almond in 
that region of space. Intuitively, the almond is not big enough to be able to fill the extended 
simple region. It follows that the almond cannot be said to be exactly located at that region. 
Therefore, Parsons’s system S@ cannot even get off the ground in this case. On the other 
hand, the almond clearly appears to be weakly located at the extended simple region. 
                                                     
2 Parsons (2007: 204-5). 
3 In addition, the notion of entire location can be defined in S@ and S@O, respectively, as follows: 
(ENT-@)  x is entirely located at r =df x is exactly located at a subregion of r 
 𝑥@<𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ∃𝑠(𝑥@𝑠 ∧  𝑠 ≤ 𝑟) 
(ENT-@𝑂)  x is entirely located at r =df x is weakly located at r and all the regions at which x is weakly 
located overlap r 
 𝑥@<𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 𝑥@𝑜𝑟 ∧ ∀𝑠(𝑥@𝑜𝑠 → 𝑟 ∘ 𝑠) 





However, the extended simple region is also the only region at which the almond is weakly 
located. It follows, thus, from S@O that the almond is pervasively and exactly located at 
that region. The argument appears to generalize. Therefore, concludes Kleinschmidt, if the 
relevant recombination principle (allowing us to ‘drop’ the almond in the extended simple 
region) is accepted, it follows that parsimonious theories of location are incompatible with 
the possibility of extended simple regions of space. 
Friends of ideologically parsimonious theories of location can choose to dispute the 
very possibility of the cases in question. Perhaps what all of this shows is only that things 
like Stoic Gunk and extended simple regions of space containing objects that are smaller 
than the regions themselves are either impossible or conceptually confused.5 However, this 
doesn’t appear to be the only possible option on the table. In fact, as Loss (2019) has 
recently argued, the case of Nolanian Stoic Gunk (or ‘gunky Spritz’ as Loss calls it) can be 
accounted for within a theory that takes as its only primitive notion the notion of plural 
pervasive location and allows for irreducibly plural locative facts of the form ‘the plurality 
of entities xx collectively fill the region r’. As Loss shows, not only does it seem possible 
to define all the standard locative notions in terms of the notion of plural pervasive location, 
but the resulting theory—which he labels ‘𝑥𝑥@>𝑆’—appears to be perfectly able to 
account for the possibility of gunky Spritz. In the case of a gunky Spritz, in fact, what 
happens is that the water and the wine collectively fill the gunky glass and every region of 
space in the gunky glass even though there is no region of space that is filled only by the 
water or only by the wine (Loss 2019: 257). 
Drawing on Loss (2019), the aim of this paper is to argue, first, that the possibility 
of Kleinschmidt’s ‘Almond in the Void’ cases is also not a threat to ideological parsimony. 
As I will show, in fact, there appears to be an intuitive and plausible way to extend Loss’s 
𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 that makes it perfectly capable of accounting for Kleinschmidt’s ‘Almond in the 
Void’ cases. Second, I will also argue that, although Loss’s 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆  cannot account for the 
possibility of multilocation, there appears to be a way to interpret its axioms that (modulo 
a slight modification of the theory) avoids this limitation, so that the kind of ideological 
parsimony defended in this paper shouldn’t be thought of as conditional on the 
impossibility of multilocation.  
I will proceed as follows. In section 2 I will briefly summarize the main definitions 
and axioms of Loss’s 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆. In section 3 I will present some further axioms that can be 
added to 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 concerning the idea that regions of space themselves may be seen as 
‘filling’ other regions of space and show how the resulting theory can accommodate all of 
Kleinschmidt’s problematic scenarios. Finally, in section 4 I will argue that it seems 
possible to formulate 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 by means of a notion of pervasive location (‘basic filling’) 
which allows for the possibility of multilocation. I will, thus, conclude that the possibility 
of exotic cases like Nolanian’s Stoic Gunk or Kleinschmidt’s Almond in the Void can be 
accepted without having to either reject the possibility of multilocation or offend the 
aesthetic sense of those who have a taste for desert ideological landscapes. 
                                                     
5 For some recent discussion on extended simple regions and the possibility of Kleinschmidt’s problematic 





2. Plural pervasive location 
In the literature on location it is common to take the main locative notions to be one-one 
and to allow, thus, only one object to bear the relevant locative relation to a certain region 
of space (or spacetime). Instead, the theory Loss (2019) labels ‘𝑥𝑥@>𝑆’ allows the 
primitive notion of the theory—that is, the notion of plural pervasive location—to be many-
one, thus making it possible for many objects to only collectively pervade a certain region 
of space.6 An intuitive gloss on the notion of plural pervasive location can be given as 
follows: a plurality of objects xx collectively pervade or, as we can say, ‘fill’, a certain 
region r just in case r is not free of any of the xx (so that each of the xx contributes to fill r) 
and every subregion of r is not free of all the xx (so that the xx do not leave out any part of 
x, so to say). Within this framework, singular pervasive location is just the limiting case of 
plural pervasive location. To say that a single object x is pervasively located at a region r 
is to say that r is filled by the (‘improper’) plurality xx of all the entities that are identical 
to x. 
Some cases of plural pervasive location are pretty standard and can be explained in 
terms of singular pervasive location. For instance, the fusion s of the regions r1 and r2 at 
which each of my hands is exactly located is such that my hands collectively fill it. In this 
case, we have that my hands, taken together, collectively fill s because they singularly fill 
r1 and r2, and s is the mereological sum of  r1 and r2. However, within 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 not every 
case of collective pervasive location can be reduced to singular locative facts. According 
to  𝑥𝑥@>𝑆, it is in principle possible for a plurality of objects to fill a region of space in a 
way that is irreducibly plural. The possibility of irreducibly plural pervasive location is the 
first ingredient of the present account of Kleinschmidt’s Almond in the Void cases. 
In what follows, ‘𝑥𝑥’, ‘𝑦𝑦’, ‘𝑧𝑧’, are plural variables, ‘𝑥 ≺ 𝑦𝑦’ stands for ‘x is one 
of the yy’, and ‘𝑓(𝑥𝑥)’ stands for ‘the fusion of the xx’.7 Furthermore, the variables ‘𝑟’, ‘𝑠’, 
‘𝑟𝑟’, ‘𝑠𝑠’ are thought of as ranging only over regions and pluralities or regions (more on 
regions below: see section 3). The primitive notion of  𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 is expressed by means of 
the multigrade two-place predicate ‘@>’ thought of as capable of having both singular and 
plural terms in its first place (so that both formulas like ‘𝑥@>𝑟’ and ‘𝑥𝑥@>𝑟’ are taken to 
be well-formed).8,9 The derivative notions of 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 are the following: 
                                                     
6 Hudson (2005) may have been the first one to consider the possibility of a fundamental locative location that 
is plural in one of its places (many thanks to an anonymous referee for this Journal). In fact, Hudson (2005) 
assumes that regions may be identified with pluralities of points, which appears to entail that facts concerning 
single objects being located at single regions may be construed as facts concerning single objects being located 
at pluralities of points, taken together: ‘When being ontologically serious about regions, I prefer that they be 
identified either with pluralities of or with mereological fusions of concrete, unextended, simple points.’ 
(Hudson 2005: 17). 
7 Following Loss (2019), I take an entity x to be a fusion of the yy just in case (i) each of the yy is part of x and 
(ii) every part of x overlaps some of the yy.  
8 On multigrade predicates see Oliver and Smiley (2004). 
9 The choice of taking the two-place predicate ‘@>’ to be multigrade in its first place entails that, for every x 
and yy such that x is the only entity among the yy (so that the yy are an ‘improper’ plurality of entities), the fact 
that 𝑥@>𝑟 and the fact that 𝑦𝑦@>𝑟 are the same fact. Alternatively, one could take @> to be strictly many-






(8)  x helps fill r (‘partial pervasive location’) =df x is one of a plurality of entities 
that collectively fill r 
 𝑥@>
𝑝
𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ∃𝑦𝑦(𝑦𝑦@>𝑟 ∧ 𝑥 ≺ 𝑦𝑦) 
 
(9)  x is omnipresent at r =df x helps fill every subregion of r 




(10) x is maximally omnipresent at r =df x is omnipresent at r and every region at 
which x is omnipresent and that has r as a part is identical to r 10 
 𝑥𝑀𝑟 =𝑑𝑓  𝑥𝑃𝑟 ∧ ∀𝑠((𝑥𝑃𝑠 ∧ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑠) → 𝑟 = 𝑠) 
 
(11) x is exactly located at r =df x fills r and every region that is filled by x and that 
has r as a part is identical to r  
 𝑥@𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 𝑥@>𝑟 ∧ ∀𝑠((𝑥@>𝑠 ∧ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑠) → 𝑟 = 𝑠) 
 
(12) x is weakly located at r =df x is maximally omnipresent at a region overlapping 
r  
 𝑥@𝑜𝑟 =𝑑𝑓  ∃𝑠(𝑥𝑀𝑠 ∧ 𝑠 ∘ 𝑟)11 
 
Notice that while the notion of weak location is defined in terms of maximal omnipresence 
(and, thus, in terms of the notion of partial pervasive location), the notion of exact location 
is defined in terms of singular full pervasive location. This leaves open the possibility that 
an object lack an exact location while possessing a weak location.  
The list continues as follows: 
 
(13) the xx are all in r =df each of the xx helps fill some subregion of r 




(14) the xx cover r =df every subregion of r is such that at least one of the xx helps 
fill it: 




                                                     
employing a plural term standing for an improper plurality of entities. Here I choose the first option mainly for 
simplicity’s sake.  
10 I am assuming in this paper a classical mereology of regions of space, which guarantees the existence of the 
fusion of all the regions of space (for some discussion on the possibility of ‘junky’ or ‘knuggy’ space see 
Parsons 2007: 209-10). 
11 In addition, the notion of entire location can be defined as follows: 
(ENT- 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆)  x is entirely located at r =df x is maximally omnipresent at a subregion of r  






(15) the xx are all pervasively in a plurality ss of regions  =df each of the xx fills at 
least one of the ss 
 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝑁>𝑠𝑠 =𝑑𝑓 ∀𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → ∃𝑠(𝑠 ≺ 𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑥@>𝑠)) 
 
(16) the xx pervasively cover a plurality ss of regions =df each of the ss is filled by 
at least one of the xx 
 𝑥𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑉>𝑠𝑠 =𝑑𝑓 ∀𝑠(𝑠 ≺ 𝑠𝑠 → ∃𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑥@>𝑠)) 
 
Notice that while ‘all in’ and ‘cover’ are defined in terms of objects partially pervading 
subregions of a certain singular region r, ‘all pervasively in’ and ‘pervasively cover’ are 
instead defined in terms of objects fully pervading regions belonging to a certain plurality 
of regions. This difference is important when it comes to providing the three axioms 
governing the notion of plural pervasive location: 
 
Axiom 1   If for some plurality ss of regions, r is the fusion of the ss and the xx are 
all pervasively in the ss and pervasively cover the ss, then the xx collectively 
fill r  
 ∃𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥𝐼𝑁>𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑥𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑉>𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑠)) → 𝑥𝑥@>𝑟 
 
Axiom 2   If the xx collectively fill r, then the xx are all in r and cover r 
 𝑥𝑥@>𝑟 →  (𝑥𝑥𝐼𝑁𝑟 ∧ 𝑥𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑟) 
 
Axiom 3   If x fills r, then it also fills every subregion of r 
 𝑥@>𝑟 → ∀𝑠(𝑠 ≤ 𝑟 → 𝑥@>𝑠) 
 
Axiom 1 takes care of the standard cases of collective pervasive location. Consider again 
the region s that is the fusion of the two regions r1 and r2 at which my hands are exactly 
located. My hands are all pervasively in those regions (as each hand fills one of them) and 
pervasively cover them (as each region is filled by one of my hands). In this case, it follows 
from axiom 1 that my hands collectively fill s. The antecedent of axiom 1, however, is not 
true in every case in which a region r is collectively filled by some plurality xx of entities 
(so that the converse of axiom 1 is not a theorem of 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆). In fact, when a plurality of 
objects collectively fill a region in a way that is irreducible to singular location, some of 
the objects in question fail to fill by themselves any region of space (more on this below). 
Axiom 2 guarantees that, in that case, the objects are nevertheless all in r (so that each of 
them contributes to fill r) and cover r (so that no part of r is free of all of them). Axiom 3 
states, quite plausibly, that filling a region entails filling each of its subregions. 
As Loss (2019) argues, Nolan’s (2006) ‘Stoic gunk’ provides a perfect example of 
irreducibly plural pervasive location. In that case, in fact, we can say that although the water 
and the wine fail to singularly fill the glass (there is not enough of either of them), they do 
fill the glass together, so that every subregion of the region enclosed by the glass is filled 
by both the water and the wine. Given the definitions just provided it follows that, although 
both the water and the wine lack an exact location, they are nevertheless weakly located in 





𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 validates the principle that Josh Parsons called ‘Functionality’: 
 
Functionality   No entity has more than one exact location12 
 (𝑥@𝑟 ∧ 𝑥@𝑠) → 𝑟 = 𝑠 
 
(see Loss 2019: 257). Functionality excludes the possibility of multilocation. I will address 
the issue of multilocation below (section 5). For the time being, notice that Kleinschmidt 
clearly intends her main claim to apply also to theories of location endorsing Functionality 
(Kleinschmidt 2016: 120–21). Finally, 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 invalidates the principle Parsons called 
‘Exactness’: 
 
Exactness  If something has a weak location, then it also has an exact location 
 ∃𝑟(𝑥@𝑜𝑟) → ∃𝑟(𝑥@𝑟) 
 
However, it validates a close enough principle, which Loss (2019) calls ‘Precision’: 
 
Precision If something has a weak location, then it is also maximally omnipresent 
somewhere. 
 ∃𝑟(𝑥@𝑜𝑟) → ∃𝑟(𝑥𝑀𝑟) 
3. How to fill a region of space 
So far, we have only considered cases in which regions are filled by (one or many) objects. 
However, nothing seems to debar us from taking also regions of space to be capable of 
filling other regions. This move is not new in the literature on location. Casati and Varzi 
(1999: 123) define the notion of region by saying that a region is an entity that is exactly 
located at itself. In our case, we can instead take a region to be an entity that fills itself:13 
 
(17) x is a region =df  x fills itself 
 𝑅𝑥 =𝑑𝑓 𝑥@>𝑥 
 
We can then add the following three axioms to our theory: 
 
Axiom 4    If x fills y, then y is a region14 
 𝑥@>𝑦 → 𝑅𝑦 
 
Axiom 5    If x is a region filling y, then y is part of x 
 (𝑅𝑥 ∧ 𝑥@>𝑦) → 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 
 
                                                     
12 Parsons (2007: 205). 
13 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this Journal for suggesting me to follow Casati and Varzi’s (1999) 
approach and to (somehow) define the notion of region in locative terms.  






Axiom 6    If each of the xx is a region, their fusion is also a region 
 ∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑅𝑦) → 𝑅𝑓(𝑥𝑥) 
 
Axiom 4 guarantees that only regions can be filled by other entities. From (17) and axiom 
3 it follows that every region fills each of its subregions. Therefore, from (17) and axioms 
3 and 5 it follows that, if x and y are regions, then x fills y if and only if y is part of x.  
 
(18) (𝑅𝑥 ∧ 𝑅𝑦) → (𝑥@>𝑦 ↔ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥) 
 
 (17), axioms 3 and 4 entail that if x is a region and y is a part of x, then y is a region too: 
 
(19) (𝑅𝑥 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥) → 𝑅𝑦 
 
It also follows from (17), axiom 5, the anti-symmetry of parthood, and the definition of 
exact location given in (11) that (as in Casati and Varzi’s system) every region is exactly 
located at itself: 
 
(20) 𝑅𝑥 → 𝑥@𝑥15 
 
In turn, this result can be used to show that, while the general principle of Functionality 
follows from axiom 1 (Loss 2019: 257), the principle that we might call ‘Region 
Functionality’—which prohibits multilocation for regions—can be proved independently 
from axiom 1 and just from (11), (17), axiom 5, and the anti-symmetry of region-parthood: 
 
Region Functionality  Every region is exactly located only at itself 
 𝑅𝑥 → ∃! 𝑦(𝑥@𝑦 ∧ 𝑥 = 𝑦)16 
 
The importance of this result will become apparent when we address the issue of 
multilocation in section 4. In fact, the way in which entities will be allowed to be 
multilocated will involve a slight modification of axiom 1. Therefore, the fact that (11), 
(17), axiom 5, and the anti-symmetry of region-parthood alone entail Region Functionality 
shows that even in the new framework regions will not be allowed to be multilocated, which 
appears to be a clear desideratum of any theory of location. Finally, axiom 6 guarantees 
that, as it is highly plausible, any fusion of regions is itself a region. There may be other 
                                                     
15 Proof. Suppose x is a region. By (17) x fills itself. Suppose that x fills a region s and that x is part of s. From 
axiom 5 we have that, since x fills s and x is a region, then s is part of x. By the anti-symmetry of parthood (a 
theorem of classical mereology; see footnote 9), it follows that x is identical to s. We have thus (i) x fills x and 
(ii) for every region s, if x fills s and x is a part of s, then x identical to s. It follows from the definition of exact 
location given in (11) that x is exactly located at x. ∎ 
16 Proof. Suppose that x is a region that is exactly located at a region y. From (17) we have that x fills itself. 
From the definition of exact location given in (11) we have that x fills y. By axiom 5, y is part of x. However, 
since x is exactly located at y it also follows from (11) that every region s that x fills and that has y as part is 





constraints on regions that can be added to 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆.
17 However, axioms 4-6 appear to be 
perfectly sufficient for the purpose of this paper, so I will not pursue this line further here 
(notice that, for readability’s sake, in what follows I will keep using ‘r’, ‘s’, ‘rr’, ‘ss’, et 
cetera as variables ranging over regions and pluralities of regions, respectively). 
Equipped with the definition of region given in (17) and axioms 4-6 we can finally 
move on to the final ingredient of my response to Kleinschmidt’s Almond in the Void 
cases. We can proceed in two steps. Consider, first, the region r at which my right thumb 
is exactly located. My right thumb fills r. Also my right hand fills r. Therefore, there is a 
plurality ss of regions such that (i) r is the fusion of the ss and (ii) my right hand and my 
right thumb, taken together, are both pervasively in the ss and pervasively cover the ss: the 
(improper) plurality of regions that are identical to r itself. It follows, thus, from axiom 1 
that r is filled also by my right thumb and my right hand taken together. It may be objected 
in this case that, although (i) both my right hand and my right thumb contribute to fill r and 
(ii) every part of r is not free of them, we also have that (iii) both my hand and my thumb 
manage to fill r by themselves. But this is just a case of harmless overdetermination. Notice 
that we are already accepting—as it is quite uncontroversial—that my hand and my thumb 
both singularly fill r. The move from a plurality of singular locative facts to a single plural 
locative fact appears to be unproblematic in this case.  
Our second and final step consists in accepting that a region can be collectively filled 
by a plurality of entities comprising both objects and regions. Consider, for instance, an 
object x that is exactly located at a region r. In this case it follows from our axioms that r 
is not only filled both by x and by r itself singularly, but also by x and r taken together. 
Consider now Kleinschmidt’s Almond in the Void case. What 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 (once extended by 
means of (17) and axioms 4-6) allows us to say is that that the region r in which the almond 
has been dropped is collectively filled by r and the almond taken together, even if there is 
no region of space that the almond fills by itself. In fact, not only is this claim perfectly 
compatible with our axioms, but it strikes one as highly plausible given what we said thus 
far about the notion of plural pervasive location. Axioms 1-6 do not require that, if an entity 
x partially fills a certain region, then there is a region that is fully filled by x. In the case of 
Stoic gunk, for instance, both the water and the wine partially fill every subregion of the 
region enclosed by the glass in which they have been poured without filling by themselves 
any region of space. In the Almond in the Void case, the almond intuitively fails to 
completely fill the extended simple region: it is just not big enough. At the same time, 
however, it appears also very intuitive to say that the almond partially fills the extended 
simple region, given that the almond is indeed located within the extended region. Our 
theory of location allows us to express the notion of partially filling a region r without 
appealing to the mereological structure of r. The almond doesn’t partially fill r because it 
                                                     
17 Since 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 allows for irreducibly plural locative facts, the following principle (banning irreducibly plural 
locative facts when the entities that are located at regions are themselves regions) also appears to be highly 
plausible: 
Axiom 7   If the rr collectively fill s, then some regions tt are such that the rr are all pervasively in 
the tt, pervasively cover the tt and s is the fusion of the tt 
 𝑟𝑟@>𝑠 →  ∃𝑡𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝐼𝑁>𝑡𝑡 ∧ 𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑂𝑉>𝑡𝑡 ∧ 𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑡)) 





fills a subregion of r. The almond partially fills r because the almond and r collectively fill 
r, while the almond fails to fill r by itself. 
Since in this case we can also say that every superregion s of r is such that s is filled 
by s and the almond taken together, what is peculiar about r is that it is, mereologically 
speaking, the smallest region that the almond helps fill. From the definition of weak and 
entire location18 it also follows that, although the almond has no exact location, it is 
maximally omnipresent at r and so it is both weakly and entirely located at r, which is, 
intuitively, precisely as it should be. Therefore, this theory of location can also easily 
distinguish between Kleinschmidt’s Almond in the void case and the case she calls 
‘Almond in the Shadow’, where the latter is just like the former except that the extended 
simple region in which the almond is dropped is of the same shape and size of the almond 
itself. In the Almond in the Shadow case, the almond doesn’t only help fill the extended 
simple region, but it also manages to fill it by itself, and so (being the extended simple 
region the maximal region the almond fills) the almond turns out to be also exactly located 
at the extended simple region, contrary to what happens in the Almond in the Void case. 
The present theory can also accommodate the case that Kleinschmidt (2016: 133-4) 
calls ‘Out of Place Tiles’. Figure 1 represents four adjacent square extended simple regions 
composing a bigger square region. A square extended simple object of the same size and 
shape of each of the four small square regions lies ‘at the center’ of the bigger region. Let 
r1, r2, r3, and r4 be the four small square regions (‘the rs’), s be the big square fusion, and x 
the object at the center of s. What our theory allows us to say in this case is that r1, r2, r3, 
r4, and the object x taken together collectively fill s even if there is no region that x fills by 
itself, and thus also no region at which x is exactly located. For each r among the rs we can 
also say that x and r collectively fill r. Therefore, x helps fill every subregion of s and is, 
thus, omnipresent at s. Since x helps fill no region that is not part of s, x is also maximally 
omnipresent at s, and so it is both weakly and entirely located at s. Furthermore, since each 
of the rs overlap the region at which x is maximally omnipresent, it also follows that x is 
weakly located at each of the rs. However, x is not entirely located at any of the rs, since it 
is clearly not maximally omnipresent at any of them. 
Therefore, it appears possible to conclude that by extending 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 with (17) and 
axioms 4-6 it is possible to adequately account for both Kleinschmidt’s Almond in the Void 
                                                     











and Out of Place Tiles cases. Since 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 features just one primitive notion, it follows 
that Almond in the Void and Out of Place Tiles are not a direct threat to parsimonious 
theories of location. 
4. On plural multilocation 
As it was noted above, 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 validates Functionality and, thus, makes multilocation 
impossible. Therefore, some may claim that the results achieved so far are at best limited, 
as they should be understood as conditional on the rejection of multilocation. As I will 
argue in this section, this objection can be resisted. 19 
Consider Figure 2. It represents a square object (‘Bob’) multilocated four times and 
‘covering’ a circular region of space (‘the circle’). Does Bob fill the circle? Well, yes and 
no. No, in the sense that Bob is smaller than the circle and every region at which Bob is 
exactly located is smaller than the circle. Yes, in the sense that no part of the circle is ‘free 
of Bob’. We may call these two ways of filling a certain region of space basic and derivative 
filling. Within a framework in which exact location is the primitive notion, basic and 
derivative filling are easy to define (to avoid confusion, I will use here ‘𝐿’ for the relevant 
primitive notion of exact location and ‘𝐿>’ and ‘𝐿𝐷>’ for basic and derivative filling, 
respectively): 
                                                     
19 Notice that 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 already allows for what may be seen as a ‘weak’ form of multilocation. Consider, in fact, 
the following principle, which can be labelled ‘Strong Functionality’: 
Strong Functionality   If an object x is exactly located at a region r, then every region s at which x is 
weakly located overlaps r 
 𝑥@𝑟 → ∀𝑠(𝑥@𝑜𝑠 → 𝑠 ∘ 𝑟) 
Imagine that someone, mixing a gunky Spritz, spills a drop of water, so that the drop of water ends up filling 
by itself a region r disjoint from the region of space enclosed by the gunky glass containing the gunky Spritz. 
In that case, r is the biggest region of space that is filled by the water alone. In fact, all the other regions of 
space that are (partially) filled by the water are subregions of the region inside the gunky glass, but the water 
doesn’t manage to fill any subregion of that region by itself. It follows, thus, that according to 𝑥𝑥𝑆@>, the 
water is exactly located at r, even if it is also weakly located at a region that is disjoint from r (that is, inside 
the gunky glass). However, this kind of multilocation appears to be indeed too weak to be used for the common 
uses of multilocation, like the locative interpretation of endurantism (see, among others: Sattig 2006, Eagle 










Basic Filling    x basically fills r =df x is exactly located at a superregion of r 
 𝑥𝐿>𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ∃𝑠(𝑥𝐿𝑠 ∧ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑠) 
 
Derivative Filling   x derivatively fills r =df x doesn’t basically fill r and for some 
plurality ss of regions x is exactly located at each of the ss and r is part of the 
fusion of the ss 
 𝑥𝐿𝐷>𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 ~𝑥𝐿>𝑟 ∧ ∃𝑠𝑠(∀𝑠(𝑠 ≺ 𝑠𝑠 → 𝑥𝐿𝑠) ∧ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑓(𝑠𝑠)) 
 
However, it appears to be perfectly possible to take the notion of basic filling as primitive 
(for simplicity’s sake in what follows I will just use ‘filling’ when I mean ‘basic filling’).  
Gilmore (2018) gives the following intuitive glosses on the notion of exact and weak 
location: 
 
‘an entity x is exactly located at a region y if and only if x has […] exactly the same 
shape and size as y and stands […] in all the same spatial or spatiotemporal relations 
to other entities as does y.’ (Gilmore, 2018: §2) 
 
It is possible to provide a similar intuitive gloss for the primitive notion of singular basic 
filling: 
 
Singular basic filling   An entity x basically fills a region y if and only if no part of 
y is free of x and the size of y is not bigger than the size of x 
 
Singular basic filling is thought of as not complying with the following principle of 
‘Additive Filling’ (for disambiguation I will use in what follows ‘𝔸>’ for this primitive 
notion of basic filling): 
 
Additive Filling   If for some plurality ss of regions, r is the fusion of the ss and x 
fills each of the ss, then x also fills r 
 (𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑠) ∧ ∀𝑠(𝑠 ≺ 𝑠𝑠 → 𝑥𝔸>𝑠)) → 𝑥𝔸>𝑟 
 
This fact allows for the possibility of multilocation if we define the notion of exact location 
along the lines of (11) (and, thus, as a maximal region basically filled by an entity): 
 
(11*) x is exactly located at r =df x fills r and every region that is filled by x and that 
has r as a part is identical to r  
 𝑥𝔸𝑟 =𝑑𝑓 𝑥𝔸>𝑟 ∧ ∀𝑠((𝑥𝔸>𝑠 ∧ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑠) → 𝑟 = 𝑠)
20 
                                                     
20 The notion of singular derivative filling can be defined as in Derivative Filling. Notice that, assuming axiom 
3 (expressed by means of the notion of basic singular filling), this notion of derivative filling is additive in the 
sense of Additive Filling. Proof. Suppose that r is the fusion of the ss and that x derivatively fills each of the 
ss. From the definition of derivative filling it follows that each of the ss is part of a fusion of exact locations of 
x. Let tt be the plurality of exact locations of x that overlap some of the ss. It follows from classical mereology 






Consider again Figure 2. In that case, there are four square regions of space that are 
maximal regions basically filled by Bob, so that Bob is also exactly located at them. 
However, Bob doesn’t basically fill the circle: it only derivatively fills it, in virtue of being 
exactly located at each of the four square regions.  
So far, we have considered only cases of singular basic filling. We can now move 
on to the more general notion of plural basic filling which we can take to be our new 
primitive locative notion.21 An intuitive gloss of the notion of plural basic filling can be 
given as follows: 
 
Plural basic filling   A plurality xx of entities collectively fill a region y if and only 
if no part of y is free of all the xx and the size of y is not bigger than the sum 
of the sizes of all the xx.  
 
In this case, we can adopt the definitions and axioms of 𝑥𝑥𝑆@> and formulate them using 
the notion of plural basic filling, with the only exception of Axiom 1. In fact, it is easy to 
check that Axiom 1 entails Additive Filling when the xx are the (improper) plurality of 
entities that are identical to a certain entity x. In order to avoid this, it is sufficient to re-
formulate Axiom 1 by replacing the notion of ‘all pervasively in’ with the notion which we 
may label ‘all uniquely in’ (notice that in what follows I will take ‘𝔸>’ to be multigrade in 
its first place):22 
 
(21) the xx are all uniquely in a plurality ss of regions  =df each of the xx fills just 
one of the ss 
𝑥𝑥𝑈>𝑠𝑠 =𝑑𝑓 ∀𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → ∃! 𝑠(𝑠 ≺ 𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑥𝔸>𝑠)) 
 
Axiom 1*   If for some plurality ss of regions, r is the fusion of the ss and the xx are 
all uniquely in the ss and pervasively cover the ss, then the xx collectively fill 
r  
 ∃𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥𝑈>𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑥𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑉>𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑠)) → 𝑥𝑥𝔸>𝑟 
 
Axiom 1* doesn’t entail Additive Filling. In fact, if the xx are all identical to x and a 
plurality ss of regions are covered by the xx, it doesn’t follow that x also fills their fusion r, 
as in this case the xx are not all uniquely in the ss (since it is false that x—and, thus, each 
of the xx—fills only one of the ss). A notion of plural ‘generic’ filling can be defined as 
follows:  
 
                                                     
subregion of r. Each of the ss is a part of r that is only derivatively filled by x. Therefore, x doesn’t basically 
fill r. We have, thus, from the definition of derivative filling that x derivatively fills r. ∎ 
21 Recall that the notion of plural basic filling is more general than the notion of singular basic filling because 
it subsumes cases of singular basic filling as cases in which the plurality of entities in question is an improper 
plurality, that is, a plurality of entities identical to just one entity (like the ‘plurality’ of things that are identical 
to x). See, also, footnote 8. 





Generic Filling  
(i) if the xx fill r, then the xx generically fill r;  
 𝑥𝑥𝔸>𝑟 → 𝑥𝑥𝔸>
𝐺 𝑟 
(ii) if the 𝑦𝑦1 generically fill 𝑠1, the 𝑦𝑦2 generically fill 𝑠2,…, the 𝑦𝑦𝑛 
generically fill 𝑠𝑛, the xx are the plurality of entities that are identical to 
either one of the 𝑦𝑦1, one of the 𝑦𝑦2, …, or one of the 𝑦𝑦𝑛, and r is the 
sum of the plurality of regions [𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛], then the xx generically fill r; 
 (𝑦𝑦1𝔸>
𝐺 𝑠1 ∧ 𝑦𝑦2𝔸>
𝐺 𝑠2 ∧ … ∧ 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝔸>
𝐺 𝑠𝑛 ∧ ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ (𝑧 ≺ 𝑦𝑦1 ∨ 𝑧 ≺
𝑦𝑦2 ∨ … ∨ 𝑧 ≺ 𝑦𝑦𝑛)) ∧ 𝑟 = 𝑓([𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛])) → 𝑥𝑥𝔸>
𝐺 𝑟 
(iii) in no other case the xx generically fill r. 
 
A plurality xx of entities can then be said to derivatively fill a region r if and only if, the xx 
generically fill r but they don’t basically fill it. 
Both the notions of singular and plural basic filling appear to be intelligible. At the 
same time they both appear to make multilocation possible. As for the case of multilocation 
involving plural basic filling, consider the possibility of an enduring gunky Spritz 
multilocated at two temporally disjoint regions r and s. As in Loss’s (2019) case, there is 
no region that either the water and the wine manage to fill by themselves. However, they 
collectively fill both r and s: 
 
(22) (𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝔸>𝑟 ∧ (𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝔸>𝑠 
 
Furthermore, we can assume that r and s are both maximal regions that are basically (and 
collectively) filled by the water and the wine taken together: 
 
(23) ∀𝑥 (((𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝔸>𝑥 ∧ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑥) → 𝑟 = 𝑥) 
 
(24) ∀𝑥 (((𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝔸>𝑥 ∧ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑥) → 𝑠 = 𝑥) 
 
The Spritz is here thought of as the fusion of the water and the wine, so that, intuitively, it 
singularly fills both r and s: 
 
(25) 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑧𝔸>𝑟 ∧ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑧𝔸>𝑠 
 
Since Additive Filling is invalid in this case, there is no problem in taking r and s to be 
both maximal regions that are filled by the Spritz. It follows, therefore, the Spritz is exactly 
located at both r and s, and thus, that it is multilocated: 
 






The possibility of Nolan’s (2006) Stoic Gunk and Kleinschmidt’s (2016) Almond in the 
Void cases has been used to threaten ideologically parsimonious theories of location 
positing just one locative notion as primitive. As I have argued in this paper, there is no 
need to reject the possibility of this kind of exotica in order to keep one’s theory of location 
ideologically tidy. In fact, a theory assuming as primitive a notion of plural pervasive 
location appears to be able to deal with the possibility of both Nolan’s Stoic Gunk (as 
argued by Loss 2019) and Kleinschmidt’s Almond in the Void. As I have suggested in the 
final part of the paper, contrary to what is claimed by Loss (2019), the impossibility of 
multilocation is not a price location theorists have to pay for ideological parsimony in this 
case, as Loss’s theory 𝑥𝑥@>𝑆 can be reformulated (and slightly modified) by means of a 
different primitive notion of plural pervasive location that seems to be not only clearly 
intelligible but also perfectly consistent with the possibility of multilocation.23 
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